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Abstract
Timing side channels in two-user schedulers are studied. When two users share a scheduler, one
user may learn the other user’s behavior from patterns of service timings. We measure the information
leakage of the resulting timing side channel in schedulers serving a legitimate user and a malicious
attacker, using a privacy metric defined as the Shannon equivocation of the user’s job density. We show
that the commonly used first-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheduler provides no privacy as the attacker is able
to to learn the user’s job pattern completely. Furthermore, we introduce an scheduling policy, accumulate-
and-serve scheduler, which services jobs from the user and attacker in batches after buffering them. The
information leakage in this scheduler is mitigated at the price of service delays, and the maximum privacy
is achievable when large delays are added.
I. INTRODUCTION
Timing channels are created when information is transmitted in event timings. For instance, in packet
networks, not only the packets’ contents, but also their inter-arrival times can be used to carry information.
This work was supported in part by National Science Foundation through the grant CCF 10-65022, CCF 10-54937 CAR, and
in part by Air Force through the grant FA9550-11-1-0016, FA9550-10-1-0573. This work was presented in part at ISIT’11.
X. Gong is with the Coordinated Science Laboratory and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801 USA (email: xungong1@illinois.edu)
N. Kiyavash is with the Coordinated Science Laboratory and the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801 USA (email: kiyavash@illinois.edu)
P. Venkitasubramaniam is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Lehigh University, Bethlehem PA
18015 USA (email: parv.v@lehigh.edu)
October 9, 2018 DRAFT
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
34
84
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
14
 Ju
n 2
01
3
2Traditionally, timing channels are synonymous with covert channels, wherein parties are not allowed to
communicate yet they do so [1]. Take the CPU scheduling channel in multi-level secure computer systems
for example [2], [3]. By modulating the number of quanta occupying the CPU, one process can signal
messages covertly to another with a lower security level. The recipient process is able to decode these
messages from observing the CPU’s busy periods. More recently, timing channels are also frequently
exploited to implement side channel attacks. Unlike covert channels, there is no active message sender in
a side channel. Instead, a malicious process may passively or actively learn about the activities of a victim
process by utilizing the timing evidence left on the shared resource. For instance, in the aforementioned
CPU case, the number of CPU quanta required for completing a job implicitly reveals information about
the process issuing it. A malicious process with access to the same CPU, can possibly infer unintended
information about the underlying activities of the victim process. For example, if the victim process is
running a decryption function, the attacker may learn the encryption key from observing the time it takes
for completing the decryption operation [4], [5].
Timing side channels are increasingly more perilous for user privacy as the result of more of our daily
activities moving to networks where coupling of resources is inevitable. For example, in the software-as-
a-service cloud computing platform deployed by Amazon, a server usually hosts jobs from several clients,
which gives malicious clients the chance of probing workloads of neighbors [6]. A timing side channel
was recently discovered within home digital subscriber line (DSL) routers, using which an attacker learns
a user’s web traffic pattern [7], [8]. This attack exploits the fact that packets downloaded in a DSL link are
processed through an FCFS buffer, as shown in Figure 1. The attacker Bob sends pings (Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) requests) to measure round trip times (RTT) for reaching the victim, Alice’s,
computer. The ping requests along with Alice’s web packets wait in the buffer to be processed. Thus,
ping responses are delayed whenever Alice’s applications download large volumes of traffic. Figure 2
illustrates this scenario. Specifically, Figure 2(a) depicts the RTTs of Bob’s ping packets issued every 10
ms, and Figure 2(b) shows the data volume downloaded by Alice during the same time period. It can be
clearly seen that Bob’s RTTs reveal the pattern of Alice’s arrival process which may be further processed
to identify the webpage Alice is browsing [7].
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Fig. 1. A timing side channel in DSL routers. The user Alice’s download packets and the Bob’s ping packets share services
from the DSL router. As a result, the timings of Bob’s packets convey information regarding sizes of Alice’s packets.
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Fig. 2. Information leakage through the timing side channel inside DSLs. (a) shows the total size of packets downloaded by
Alice during every interval of 10 ms. (b) plots the RTT of Bob’s ping that is issued every 10 ms to Alice’s computer.
A. Related Work
Some noteworthy contributions in analyzing the communication capacity of covert timing channels
include [2], [3], [9], [10]. Anantharam and Verdu´ analyzed the communication capacity of a timing channel
for a FCFS queue servicing jobs from one single arrival process [9]. The communication capacity in their
model depends on the service model; the minimum capacity was shown to be achieved by exponentially
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4distributed service times. The communication capacity between job processes of a round-robin CPU
scheduler was studied in [2], [3]. Millen proved the maximum timing channel information rate of a
round-robin scheduler is log
(
1+
√
5
2
)
bits per quantum, achieved when the sender uniformly picks an
arrival pattern for issuing jobs. Additionally, techniques to mitigate covert channels were studied in [11]–
[14], where the main idea is to try to disrupt the communication among the processes by adding ‘dummy’
service delays through an intermediate device, referred to as ‘pump’ or ‘jammer’.
We study the timing side channel between two users, an attacker and a regular user, sending jobs
that are scheduled through a shared server. Information leakage in this side channel is determined by the
scheduling policy. In this paper, we quantify information leakage using Shannon equivocation and analyze
privacy of commonly used FCFS policy. Similar studies under this model can be found in [15]–[17],
where minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) and attack-dependent metrics were used.
Our main results are summarized in the following.
• We develop an information-theoretic framework for quantifying information leakage of timing side
channels in schedulers using Shannon’s equivocation as a metric to access the privacy level provided
by a scheduler (for details on Shannon’s equivocation, refer [18]).
• We characterize the information leakage of a FCFS policy and show that the attacker learns the user’s
arrival pattern exactly if sufficient rate is available to him for sampling the queue. This demonstrates
that FCFS is a poor policy in terms of preserving user’s privacy despite its ease of implementation,
high QoS, and ubiquity.
• We suggest a policy, accumulate-and-serve, which trades off privacy and QoS (delay) by servicing
jobs from the attacker and the user in separate batches buffered periodically. We prove that full
privacy is achieved when large delays are added.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A formal definition of our problem including the system
model and metric are discussed in Section §II. Privacy of the FCFS scheduler is analyzed in Section §III,
The analysis for the privacy of the accumulate-and-serve policy follows in Section §IV. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section §V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, the problem formulation and notation are introduced. Throughout the paper: bold script
A denotes the infinite sequence {A1, A2, · · · }, An denotes the sequence {A1, A2, · · · , An}, and Aji
October 9, 2018 DRAFT
5User
Attacker
 
!
A1, A2, · · · , Am
D1, D2, · · · , DmScheduler
Fig. 3. A scheduler services jobs from two arrival processes; one is from a malicious attacker who wants to probe the job
pattern of the other, a legitimate user. The attacker sends jobs to the scheduler to get knowledge of the queue status, based on
which it infers the legitimate user’s privacy.
Time
T=3
User
Arrival
t = 3t = 0 t = 6
 0 = 0  1 = 1  2 = 1
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{
Fig. 4. The user’s job pattern X = {X1, X2, · · · } defined as the number of jobs in every clock period of T time slots. Here
T = 3, X1 = 2, and X2 = 1.
denotes the subsequence {Ai, Ai+1, · · · , Aj}, where j ≥ i.
A. System Model
Figure 3 depicts the shared scheduler which processes jobs from a regular user and an attacker in
discrete time. At every time slot, the user (and the attacker) can either issue one job or remain idle. All jobs
have the same size and take one slot to get serviced. We assume that the user’s arrival process is Bernoulli
with rate λ. Note that the difficulty in learning user’s arrival pattern depends on the unpredictability of
the pattern. It is easier for the attacker to learn the arrival pattern of the user if the user issues jobs in a
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6predicable or regular pattern such as ON/OFF traffic with a fixed period. On the other hand, the Bernoulli
process is quite unpredictable as it is the maximum entropy discrete time stationary process for a fixed
arrival rate (similar results for Poisson arrivals can be found in [19]). The attacker is allowed to send his
jobs in any time slots as long as his long term rate ω does not exceed 1− λ, so as to avoid an unstable
queue. Unlike in a denial of a service attack, in a side channel attack, the attacker does not benefit from
overloading the server which results in dropping packets and hence loosing information.
The goal of the attacker is to learn the user’s job pattern X = {X1, X2, · · · }, as depicted in Figure 4.
Definition 1: The user’s job pattern in the kth clock period is given by
Xk =
kT−1∑
j=(k−1)T
δj , k = 1, 2, · · · , (1)
where δj ∼ Bernoulli(λ), j = 1, 2, · · · , labels the arrival event from the user at every time slot.
The job pattern X presents a sampled view of the user’s arrival process, with an observation every T time
slots. Among all the sampling sequences with rate 1T , the evenly-paced sampling captures the maximum
information of the original Bernoulli process [20]. This implies that X serves a proper objective for an
attacker who wants to know as accurate information about user. The clock period T sets the granularity
of this side channel attack. A smaller value of T indicates that the attacker intends to obtain a higher
resolution view of the user’s activity. In the extreme case of T = 1, the attacker wants to know learn
whether a job was issued by the user in every single time slot.
B. Privacy Metric
We measure the user’s privacy in the shared scheduler as the equivocation rate of his job pattern
given the attacker’s observations of his own jobs. Shannon equivocation is frequently used as a metric
for information leakage in communication systems, such as the wiretap channel [21]. Beside being a
measure of uncertainty, equivocation provides a tight upper and lower bound for the minimum error
probability [22], which implies our proposed metric also bounds the error the attacker incurs in guessing
user’s job pattern. Such an error has been studied using a minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) metric
in [15], [16].
Denote the arrival and departure times of attacker’s jobs by A = {A1, A2, · · · } and D = {D1, D2, · · · }
respectively. The attacker’s arrival rate can be represented by ω = lim
k→∞
k
Ak
. Suppose m attacker’s jobs
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7were issued during the first n clock periods, the uncertainty of the first n job patterns to the attacker is
then H (Xn|Am,Dm).
Definition 2: The user’s privacy in a shared scheduler serving him and an attacker is given by
PT = min
A:ω<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H (Xn|Am,Dm)
n
, (2)
where m = sup
k
{k : Ak ≤ nT}.
PT characterizes the minimum equivocation of the user’s job patterns for the best attack strategy
satisfying rate restriction. The smaller the privacy PT , more the information that is leaked to the attacker
through the timing side channel in the scheduler. A similar equivocation-based metric was proposed
in [17], where however the attacker’s strategy is restricted as Bernoulli sampling and the metric was
attack-dependent.
The value of PT is largely determined by the policy the scheduler uses. If the scheduler preassigns
fixed time slots to service each party, as in TDMA, user’s privacy is guaranteed because the service time
of attacker’s jobs is statistically independent with user’s job patterns. In that case, TDMA achieves the
maximum privacy, as given by
PTTDMA = H(X), (3)
where X is binomial B(T, λ). However, such a policy results in idling of scheduler which wastes
resources and may add significant delays. Therefore, complete isolation of users’ job processes is often
not achievable in practice as the scheduler is required to maintain a certain level of QoS, such as average
job delay. In such cases, a timing side channel is inevitable. In the next section, we analyze the leakage
of such a channel for FCFS scheduler which is widely deployed in practice.
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN FIRST-COME-FIRST-SERVE SCHEDULER
FCFS is a simple scheduling policy commonly used in network systems. At each time slot, the FCFS
scheduler services the job at the head of the queue. In the rest of this paper, for the sake of convenience
of analysis, we assume that when both user and attacker issue a job in the same time slot, the attacker’s
job enters the queue first. As the scheduler never idles as long as the job queue is not empty, FCFS
results in minimum average delay.1 However, FCFS exposes the queue length q(·) of the buffer to the
1This is true when all jobs have the same size.
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Fig. 5. Our attack strategy: the attacker issues a Type-I job on every clock tick and a Type-II job on each slot between clock
ticks with probability of ωT−1
T−1 .
attacker as the delay of the ith attacker’s job is directly related to the number of jobs buffered before its
arrival, i.e.,
q(Ai) = Di −Ai − 1, (4)
where ‘1’ accounts for the service time of the ith attacker’s job itself. We subsequently show that by
using a well designed attack strategy, the attacker can indeed significantly reduce the timing privacy of
the user.
A. Attack Strategy
Recall the attacker’s objective is to learn the user’s job pattern, i.e., the number of user’s arrivals within
each clock period T . Therefore, given (4), the attacker should issue jobs at times t = 0, T, 2T, · · · , to
know the queue lengths on the clock period boundaries, which are essential to accurately estimating user’s
job pattern. Based on this observation, we design an attack strategy (Figure 5), where the attacker’s jobs
are of two types:
• Type-I jobs are issued on boundaries of clock periods, t = 0, T, 2T, · · · ;
• Type-II jobs are issued on slots inside a clock period according to a Bernoulli process. We use the
remaining rate after issuing Type-I jobs to issue them. The probability of having one Type-II job in
each slot within a clock period is ωT−1T−1 .
The purpose of issuing Type-II jobs is to ensure the queue is not empty. This reason for this becomes
apparent in §III-C.
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9The attack strategy in Figure 5 is not feasible when T is too small, as the attacker’s rate is bounded
by 1− λ. This poses an intrinsic limit on how much the attacker can learn from the side channel. More
precisely, the attacker can not expect to learn user’s job pattern at a resolution finer than his maximum
sampling rate. For this reason, for the rest of our analysis, we consider learning the job pattern within
the feasible resolution of the attacker; i.e., T ≥
⌊
1
1−λ
⌋
.
B. An Upper Bound on Privacy
The attack strategy described in §III-A guarantees certain level of information gain for the attacker,
and therefore sets an upper bound on the user’s privacy in this side channel. Denote in this attack
strategy A˜ = {A˜1, A˜2, · · · } the arrival times of attacker’s jobs, and D˜ = {D˜1, D˜2, · · · } the corresponding
departure times. From (2), we know
PT ≤ min
ω:ω<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H
(
Xn|A˜m˜, D˜m˜
)
n
, (5)
where m˜ = sup{k : A˜k ≤ nT} is the total number of jobs sent by the attacker over period nT .
We first analyze the queuing stability of the scheduler under this attack strategy.
Lemma 3.1: When λ + ω < 1, the queue lengths observed at clock period boundaries {q(iT )}, i =
0, 1, · · · , form a positive recurrent Markov chain.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Corollary 3.2: When λ + ω < 1, the pairs
{
A˜k, q(A˜k); (i− 1)T ≤ A˜k ≤ iT
}
, i = 1, 2, · · · , form a
positive recurrent Markov chain.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1: Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 demonstrate the existence of steady state of the scheduler’s
queue length. This implies the convergence of the limit of the equivocation rate in (5), using which we
derive an upper bound on user’s privacy.
Lemma 3.3: Consider the FCFS scheduler with the total job rate λ + ω < 1, where λ and ω denote
the user’s arrival rate and attacker’s arrival rate respectively. The user’s privacy is upper-bounded by
PT ≤ min
ω:ω<1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1)
]
, (6)
where s is binomial B
(
T − 1, ωT−1T−1
)
, τi is geometric G
(
ωT−1
T−1
)
, and Xi is binomial B(τi, λ) for
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i = 1, 2, · · · , s+ 1. Moreover,
s+1∑
i=1
τi = T, (7)
and Q1, Qs+2 are identically distributed and
Qi+1 = (Qi + χi + 1− τi)+ , ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , s+ 1. (8)
Proof: Expand the conditional entropy in (5) using the entropy chain rule:
H
(
Xn
∣∣A˜m˜, D˜m˜) = n∑
k=1
H
(
Xk
∣∣Xk−1, A˜m˜, D˜m˜)
(a)
=
n∑
k=1
H
(
Xk
∣∣Xk−1, A˜m˜, q(A˜1), · · · , q(A˜m˜)) (9)
where (a) follows from (4).
Denote the total number of user’s jobs sent during [A˜i, A˜i+1) (between two consecutive attack jobs)
by Xˆi. Note that
Xˆi =
A˜i+1−1∑
j=A˜i
δj , i = 1, 2, · · · , (10)
wherein δj is a Bernoulli(λ) indicator of whether user issued a job at the jth time slot.
From (1), we know
Xk =
∑
i:(k−1)T≤A˜i<kT
Xˆi, k = 1, 2, · · · . (11)
Plug (11) into (9),
H
(
Xn
∣∣A˜m˜, D˜m˜) = n∑
k=1
H
 ∑
i:(k−1)T≤A˜i<kT
Xˆi
∣∣∣Xk−1, A˜m˜, q(A˜1), · · · , q(A˜m˜)

(b)
=
n∑
k=1
H
 ∑
i:(k−1)T≤A˜i<kT
Xˆi
∣∣∣A˜i, q(A˜i); (k − 1)T ≤ A˜i ≤ kT
 (12)
where (b) holds because the queue length update equation at the clock boundaries is given by
q(A˜i+1) =
(
q(A˜i) + 1 + Xˆi − (A˜i+1 − A˜i)
)
+
, i = 1, 2, · · · . (13)
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From Corollary 3.2, we know that
{
A˜i, q(A˜i), (k − 1)T ≤ A˜i ≤ kT
}
, k = 1, 2, · · · , form a positive
recurrent Markov chain. Hence, the conditional entropy term in the sum of the last line in (12) converges as
k →∞, with the limit determined by the stationary distribution of state {A˜i, q(A˜i); (k−1)T ≤ A˜i ≤ kT}.
Assume this chain is in the stationary state, and let
s =
∣∣∣ {i : (k − 1)T < A˜i < kT} ∣∣∣ be the the number of Type-II attack jobs issued in a clock period
T . Then s ∼ B
(
T − 1, ωT−1T−1
)
(for the attack strategy defined in §III-A);
τi ∼ G
(
ωT−1
T−1
)
, i = 1, 2, · · · , s + 1 denote inter-arrival time of attacker’s jobs in a clock period T .
Clearly, sum of these inter-arrival times equals T ;
Xi ∼ B(τi, λ), i = 1, 2, · · · , s + 1, be the number of user’s jobs arriving between every pair of
consecutive attacker’s jobs;
Qs+2 denote the queue lengths seen by the total s+ 2 attacker’s jobs sent in [(k− 1)T, kT ] (s of Type-II
and 2 of Type-I). The queue length in sequence Qs+2 updates following from (8). Moreover, in the
stationary state, queue lengths at clock period boundaries–Q1, Qs+2–have identical distribution.
Then, we can write the limit of the conditional entropy in (12) as
lim
k→∞
H
 ∑
i:(k−1)T≤A˜i≤kT
Xˆi
∣∣∣A˜i, q(A˜i); (k − 1)T ≤ A˜i ≤ kT
 = Es [H (s+1∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣τ s+1,Qs+2)] .
(14)
Substituting (12) back into (5), and applying (14) and Cesa`ro mean theorem [23, Theorem 4.2.3],
PT ≤ min
ω:ω<1−λ
Es
[
H
(
s+1∑
i=1
Xi|τ s+1,Qs+2
)]
≤ min
ω:ω<1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
H
(Xi|τ s+1,Qs+2)]
(c)
= min
ω:ω<1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1)
]
.
(15)
where (c) is based on the queue length update equation (8).
C. FCFS Provides Zero Limiting Privacy
We next show that the bound in Lemma 3.3 converges to 0 as attacker’s job rate approcaches 1− λ.
Therefore, FCFS scheduler provides no privacy.
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Lemma 3.4: If the current arrival of the attacker sees a non-empty queue, he learns the exact number
of jobs the user has issued between the attacker’s current and previous jobs, or
H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1) = 0, if Qi+1 > 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , s+ 2, (16)
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1.
Proof: From (8) when Qi+1 > 0, we have
Xi = Qi+1 −Qi + τi − 1, (17)
which implies H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1) = 0.
Remark 2: The intuition provided by Lemma 3.4 is that when the queue is nonempty, the attacker
does not miss the legitimate user’s arrivals. Therefore, the attacker has the incentive to issue as many
jobs as possible to create a queue. This is the motivation for issuing Type-II jobs in our attack strategy
of §III-A.
When the attacker makes full use of available rate, he always sees a busy scheduler, as stated in the next
lemma.
Lemma 3.5: In a FCFS scheduler, an attacker issuing jobs according to time sequence A˜ as described
in §III-A at the maximum available rate rarely sees an empty queue, or
lim
ω→1−λ
Pr(Qi > 0) = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , s+ 2, (18)
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1.
Proof: From (8), if the attacker sees a queue length greater than T −1 at the clock boundary, then all
its jobs arriving in the the following clock period will experience a nonempty queue. Hence, a sufficient
statement for (18) to hold is that
lim
ω→1−λ
Pr(Q1 ≥ T − 1) = 1. (19)
See Lemma A.1 in Appendix C for a proof of (19).
Based on Lemma 3.3, Lemma 3.4, and Lemma 3.5, we now present the main theorem characterizing
the privacy behavior of FCFS schedulers.
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Theorem 3.6: The FCFS scheduler provides no privacy of user’s job patterns, or
PT = 0. (20)
Proof: From (6),
PT ≤ min
ω:ω<1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1)
]
≤ lim
ω→1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1)
]
(d)
= lim
ω→1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
Pr(Qi+1 = 0)H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1 = 0)
]
= lim
ω→1−λ
Es
[
s+1∑
i=1
(1− Pr(Qi+1 > 0))H (Xi|τi, Qi, Qi+1 = 0)
]
(e)
= 0
(21)
where (d) follows from (16), and (e) results from (18). Since PT defined in (2), cannot be negative, we
must have PT = 0.
IV. AN ACCUMULATE-AND-SERVE SCHEDULER
As we showed in the previous section, FCFS preserves little privacy despite its QoS and complexity
advantages. In this section, we propose a new policy, accumulate-and-serve that mitigates the side channel
information leakage by adding service delays. This scheduling policy is similar to the periodic dump
jammer previously proposed to mitigate covert channels [14]. By buffering jobs periodically and servicing
batches belonging to different users separately, the correlation between the attacker’s departure process
and user’s arrival process is greatly reduced. As a result, the accumulate-and-serve scheduler gives the
attacker a coarser view of the user’s job patterns, compared to a FCFS scheduler.
Our accumulate-and-serve scheduler works as follows: time slots are divided into intervals with length
of Tacc. The scheduler accumulates all jobs that have arrived during an interval into two batches; one
consisting of the user’s jobs and the other containing all jobs from the attacker. Then the scheduler
starts servicing these two batches starting at the next available time slot (after completing all previously
scheduled jobs). The order at which the user and the attacker get served is fixed for all the accumulate
October 9, 2018 DRAFT
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Time
Attacker 
Departure
User
Departure
Tacc = 6
t = 0
T = 3
Z1 = 4 {
t = 9 t = 18
Fig. 6. An example of the accumulate-and-serve policy. At the beginning of each interval, the scheduler services immediately all
jobs which arrived during the previous interval in two batches; first one user and then the other. In this example, the accumulate
interval Tacc = 3T , and the user’s jobs are serviced first.
intervals.
An example of accumulate-and-serve scheduler is shown in Figure 6, where the accumulate interval
is set as Tacc = 9. In Figure 6, the scheduler first waits for 9 time slots, and then starts processing the
accumulated jobs, 4 from the user and 3 from the attacker, at t = 9 in two batches. The service order in
this example is giving priority to the user’s job batches.
A. The Limitation of Attacks on Accumulate-and-Server Schedulers
Under the accumulate-and-serve policy, the correlation between the user and attacker’s processes is
only through the size of job batches. Therefore, the attacker can at most learn the total size of user’s jobs
in each batch, and not the arrival pattern inside the accumulate period. In other words, the accumulate
interval Tacc sets an upper bound on the resolution to which the attacker can learn user’s job pattern.
Denote the user’s job pattern within one accumulate interval by Zk,
Zk =
kTacc−1∑
j=(k−1)Tacc
δj , k = 1, 2, · · · . (22)
Lemma 4.1: In an accumulate-and-serve scheduler serving a user and an attacker, the attacker’s ob-
servation, the sequence Z and user’s job pattern form a Markov chain, i.e.,
A,D→ Z→ X (23)
Proof: Assume that the first attacker’s job in the kth accumulate interval arrives at time Ak∗ , its
departure time depends on whether the scheduler gives priority to the user’s job batch or the attacker’s.
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If it is the former, we have
Dk∗ = max{Dk∗−1, kTacc}+ Zk + 1, (24)
where Dk∗−1 is the time the services of all previously accumulated jobs are completed, and Zk is the total
service time of user’s job batch accumulated in the current kth interval. If attacker’s job batch receives
services first, then the scheduler finishes all jobs from previous accumulate intervals by Dk∗−1 + Zk−1,
and starts immediately to serve the newly buffered jobs from the attacker, in which case
Dk∗ = max{Dk∗−1 + Zk−1, kTacc}+ 1. (25)
Once Dk∗ is determined, the rest of the jobs in the kth batch of attacker are serviced back to back.
Equations (24) and (25) imply that the sequence Z is a sufficient statistic of X to generate the departure
times of the attacker. Thus (23) holds.
Remark 3: Lemma 4.1 imposes an upper bound on the information leakage or equivalently a lower
bound on the privacy. Specifically, it implies that the attacker learns no more than information about
X than what is contained in the sequence Z. Note that from (22), H(Z) is a monotonically decreasing
function of the accumulate interval Tacc. Therefore the scheduler can mitigate the leakage by picking a
large accumulate period Tacc albeit at the price of delay.
B. A Lower Bound on Privacy
The lower bound on privacy provided by the accumulate-and-serve scheduler is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2: In an accumulate-and-serve scheduler with Tacc > T , the user’s privacy is lower bounded
by
PT ≥
(
1− T
Tacc
+
T
TL
)
H(X)−
T ·H
(∑bTaccT c
i=1 Xi
)
Tacc
, (26)
where TL = lcm (T, Tacc), and X,X1, · · · , XbTaccT c are all i.i.d. binomial B(T, λ).
Proof: We first prove the case of Tacc = lT , wherein l is a positive integer, in which case the bound
in (26) reduces to
PT ≥ H(X)−
H
(∑l
i=1Xi
)
l
. (27)
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Applying the Markov chain of (23) to the privacy definition of (2), and considering the equivocation
of the first nTacc time slots, we have
PT ≥ lim
n→∞
H
(
Xnl|Zn)
nl
. (28)
Next apply the entropy chain rule to the conditional entropy of (28):
H
(
Xnl
∣∣Zn) = n∑
i=1
H
(
Xil(i−1)l+1
∣∣X(i−1)l,Zn)
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
H
(
Xil(i−1)l+1
∣∣Zi)
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
H
Xil(i−1)l+1∣∣∣ l∑
j=1
X(i−1)l+j

=
n∑
i=1
H
Xil(i−1)l+1, l∑
j=1
X(i−1)l+j
−H
 l∑
j=1
X(i−1)l+j

=
n∑
i=1
H (Xil(i−1)l+1)−H
 l∑
j=1
X(i−1)l+j
 ,
(29)
where (f), (g) both follow from the fact that user’s jobs within an accumulate interval consist of job
patterns among l T -clock periods, as given by
Zi =
l∑
j=1
X(i−1)l+j , i = 1, 2, · · ·
n
l
, (30)
which results from (22) and (1).
Substituting (29) back into (28), and we have
PT ≥
∑n
i=1
(
H
(
Xil(i−1)l+1
)
−H
(∑l
j=1X(i−1)l+j
))
nl
(h)
= H(X)−
H
(∑l
i=1Xi
)
l
(31)
where X is binomial B(T, λ), and (h) follows from the fact that Xi’s are i.i.d. binomial B(T, λ).
See Appendix D for the proof when T does not divide Tacc.
Theorem 4.3: As the accumulate interval Tacc →∞, the user’s privacy converges to
PT = H(X), (32)
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Fig. 7. A lower bound on privacy of the accumulate-and-serve scheduler, for λ = 0.4, and T = 2.
where X is binomial B(T, λ).
Proof: Consider the limit of each term in the bound of (26), we have
lim
Tacc→∞
(
1− T
Tacc
+
T
TL
)
H(X) = H(X) (33)
and
lim
Tacc→∞
T ·H
(∑bTaccT c
i=1 Xi
)
Tacc
(i)
≤ lim
Tacc→∞
log2 (2piel
′Tλ(1− λ)) +O ( 1l′T )
l′
= 0
(34)
where l′ =
⌊
Tacc
T
⌋
, and (i) follows from the approximation for binomial entropy in [24, Theorem 3].
Substituting (33) and (34) back to (28), and taking the limit Tacc →∞, we have PT ≥ H(X). However
from (3) we know that the privacy is upper-bounded by PT ≤ H(X). This completes the proof.
Figure 7 illustrates the bound in (28). Not surprisingly, the guaranteed privacy of the scheduler increases
with the accumulate interval Tacc. When Tacc is large enough, the attacker learns nearly nothing from
the side channel, which leads to the same full privacy level achieved by the TDMA scheduler. The price
of this added privacy is in QoS since the maximum extra queuing delay experienced by a job can be as
high as Tacc.
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V. CONCLUSION
We study the information leakage through timing side channel in a job scheduler shared by a legitimate
user and a malicious attacker. Utilizing the privacy metric defined as the equivocation of user’s job arrival
density, we reveal that the commonly used FCFS scheduler has a critical privacy flaw in that the attacker is
able to learn exactly user’s job pattern. To mitigate the privacy leakage in such a scheduler, we introduce
an accumulate-and-serve policy, which services jobs from the user and attacker in batches buffered during
an accumulate interval. This much weakens the correlation between user’s arrival process and attacker’s
departure process, albeit at the price of queuing delay. Our analysis indicates that full privacy can be
achieved when large accumulate intervals are used.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
When λ+ω < 1, the queue lengths observed at clock period boundaries {q(iT )}, i = 0, 1, , · · · , form
a positive recurrent Markov chain.
Proof: The Markovian property directly results from the FCFS policy and memoryless property of
user’s arrival process; given the queue length at time iT , q(iT ), the future queue lengths are independent
with the arrival history before iT .
We show the ergodicity of this Markov chain using the linear Lyapunov function as given by
V (q(iT )) = q(iT ), i = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (35)
If q(iT ) ≥ T − 1, the scheduler is guaranteed to be busy during [iT, (i+ 1)T ). Thus the queue length
at time (i+ 1)T is updated as
q ((i+ 1)T ) = q (iT ) + 1 + ai + xi − T, (36)
where ‘1’ represents the Type-I attack job sent at iT , ai is the number of Type-II attack jobs, and xi is
the total number of user’s jobs arriving during [iT, (i+ 1)T ). ai and xi are both binomial with mean of
ωT − 1 and λT , respectively. The drift of the Lyapunov function is then written by
PV (q(iT ))− V (q(iT )) = −(1− ω − λ)T. (37)
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Additionally, during one clock period T , the buffer queue length can grow at most by T , hence the
drift is bounded by
PV (q)− V (q) ≤ T, ∀q ≥ 0. (38)
Overall, combine (37) and (38), the drift in any state satisfies
PV (q)− V (q) ≤ −+ TI{q<T}, (39)
where  = (1 − ω − λ)T , and I is an indicator function taking value of ‘1’ if q < T . Following from
Foster-Lyapunov stability criterion [25, Theorem 5], (39) implies the Markov chain {q(iT )}, i = 1, 2, · · · ,
is positive recurrent.
B. Proof of Corollary 3.2
When ω+λ < 1, the pairs
{
A˜k, q(A˜k); (i− 1)T ≤ A˜k ≤ iT
}
, i = 1, 2, · · · , form a positive recurrence
Markov chain.
Proof: Similar as the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Appendix A, the Markovian property directly results
from the FCFS service policy. We only need to show the positive recurrent part.
Notice that outgoing transitions from a state
{
A˜k, q(A˜k); (i− 1)T ≤ A˜k ≤ iT
}
depend only on the
last element in this state, q(iT ). The transition probabilities to the next state depend on job arrival events
in the next clock period [iT, (i+1)T ), which are homogenous among all clock periods. As a result, given
the stationary distribution of q(iT ), the existence of which is guaranteed by Lemma 3.1, we can easily
compute a a stationary distribution for
{
A˜k, q(A˜k); (i− 1)T ≤ A˜k ≤ iT
}
. The existence of a stationary
distribution implies that the Markov chain
{
A˜k, q(A˜k); (i− 1)T ≤ A˜k ≤ iT
}
, i = 1, 2, · · · , must be
positive recurrent [26, Definition 3.1].
C. Complement of Proof of Lemma 3.5
In this section, we analyze the stationary distribution of the queue length of the FCFS scheduler, where
the attacker issues the two types of jobs as depicted in Figure 5. Specifically, we study the high traffic
region, where the attacker’s job rate approaches its maximum, i.e., ω → 1− λ.
Lemma A.1: In the stationary state, queue lengths seen by Type-I attack jobs are always greater than
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Time
Attacker 
Arrival
User
Arrival
iT(i  1)T (i+ 1)T
`Vitual'  attack batches
Fig. 8. A ‘virtual’ attack strategy. The attacker issues jobs only on the boundaries of clock periods. At each clock tick, an
amount of 1 + ai, i = 0, 1, · · · attack jobs are sent, where ai ∼ B
(
T − 1, ωT−1
T−1
)
.
T − 1, i.e.,
lim
ω→1−λ
Pr (Q1 ≥ T − 1) = 1. (40)
where Q1 takes the stationary distribution of states in the Markov chain {q(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · .
Proof: We prove this lemma with three steps; we first construct a ‘virtual’ attack strategy which
only issues bursty jobs on clock period boundaries. We next prove that the statement of the lemma holds
for this virtual attack. Last, we show that queue length distribution in the virtual attack is dominated by
our real attack defined in Figure 5, which implies the statement in this lemma holds for the real attack.
Step 1: Consider a virtual attack strategy that works as follows: the attacker issues a batch of bursty
jobs at the beginning slot of each clock period with total number of 1 + ai, i = 0, 1, · · · , where ai is
binomial B
(
T − 1, ωT−1T−1
)
. This attack issues the same amount of jobs in each clock period as our real
attack in Figure 5, but is not feasible in reality as the attacker cannot send more than one job in one
time slot.
Step 2: Denote the queue length function under this virtual attack by qˆ(·). At the beginning of each
clock period, the queue length updates as
qˆ((i+ 1)T ) = (qˆ(iT ) + 1 + ai +Xi − T )+ , i = 0, 1, · · · . (41)
Using the same Lyapunov function as we define in (35) of the proof of Lemma 3.1, it is not hard show
that {qˆ(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · form a positive recurrent Markov chain when λ + ω < 1. Define Qˆ1 as a
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random variable with the stationary distribution of this chain, we now prove
lim
ω→1−λ
Pr
(
Qˆ1 ≥ T − 1
)
= 1 (42)
using the z-transform of sequence {qˆ(iT )}, derived from (41) as given by
Qˆ(z) =
∑T−2
k=0
∑T−2−k
r=0
∑T−2−k−r
o=0 pkurvo(z
T−1 − zk+r+o)
zT−1 −A(z)X (z) (43)
where pk = Pr
(
Qˆ1 = k
)
, ur = Pr (ai = r), and vo = Pr (Xi = o). Moreover, A(z) and X (z) are the
z-transforms of sequence {ai} and {Xi}, and
A(z) =
(
1− ωT − 1
T − 1 +
ωT − 1
T − 1 z
)T−1
(44)
and
X (z) = (1− λ+ λz)T . (45)
Subsituting (44), (45) into (43) and taking z = 1 on both sides, we get
T−2∑
k=0
pk ·
(
T−2−k∑
r=0
T−2−k−r∑
o=0
urvo(T − 1− (k + r + o))
)
= T (1− ω − λ). (46)
Dropping the terms with r > 0 or o > 0 on the left hand side of the equality, we further get
u0v0(T − 1− k)
T−2∑
k=0
pk ≤ T (1− ω − λ). (47)
Plugging in the values of u0 and v0 in (47),
T−2∑
k=0
pk ≤ (T − 1)
T−1(1− ω − λ)
T T−2(1− ω)T−1(1− λ)T (48)
Taking the limit ω → 1− λ, we get
lim
ω→1−λ
T−2∑
k=0
pk ≤ lim
ω→1−λ
(T − 1)T−1(1− ω − λ)
T T−2(1− ω)T−1(1− λ)T = 0. (49)
This completes the proof of (42).
Step 3: We next extend (42) to the case of our real attack, based on the fact that the queuing process in
the real attack dominates the queuing process in the virtual attack (See Lemma A.2 for the proof). Define
Q1 as a random variable taking the stationary distribution of states {q(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · . Lemma A.2
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tells us
lim
ω→1−λ
Pr (Q1 ≥ T − 1) ≥ lim
ω→1−λ
Pr(Qˆ1 ≥ T − 1). (50)
Plug (50) into (42), (40) is proved.
Lemma A.2: The stationary distribution of the Markov chain {qˆ(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · in the virtual attack
is dominated by the stationary distribution of the Markov chain {q(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · in the real attack;
i.e.,
Pr (Q1 ≥ q) ≥ Pr
(
Qˆ1 ≥ q
)
, ∀q ≥ 0, (51)
where Q1 and Qˆ1 are random variables taking the stationary distributions of {q(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · and
{qˆ(iT )}, i = 0, 1, · · · , respectively.
Proof: Recall in the real attack strategy, the queue length seen by each attacker’s job updates as
q(A˜j+1) =
(
q(A˜j) + 1 + Xˆj − (A˜j+1 − t˜j)
)
+
, j = 1, 2, · · · . (52)
where Xˆk is the number of user’s jobs arriving between A˜j and A˜j+1. Consider (52) for j taking values
from k to r − 1, and sum up all the resulting equations, we derive the inequality that
q(A˜r) ≥
q(A˜k) + r − k + 1 + r−1∑
j=k
Xˆj − (A˜r − A˜k)

+
. (53)
Now make k = inf{j : iT ≤ A˜j ≤ (i+ 1)T} and r = sup{j : iT ≤ A˜j ≤ (i+ 1)T}, i.e., indices of
the attacker’s jobs sent at time iT and (i+ 1)T , we get
q((i+ 1)T ) ≥ (q(iT ) + 1 + ai +Xi − T )+ (54)
where Xi =
∑
j:iT≤A˜j<(i+1)T
Xˆj is the number of user’s jobs arriving in the ith clock period, and ai =
|{j : iT < A˜j < (i+ 1)T}| is the number of Type-II jobs sent by the attacker in the ith clock period.
Compare (54) with the queue length update equation for the virtual attack in (41), we can show by
induction that q(iT ) ≥ qˆ(iT ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , assuming q(0) = qˆ(0) = 0, which implies (51).
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the accumulate-and-serve scheduler when T = 3 and Tacc = 4. The boundaries of the clock periods
and accumulate intervals overlap every 12 time slots. Some job pattern is split by the accumulate interval boundaries into two
pieces, e.g., X2 = Y1 + Y2.
D. Continuation of proof of Theorem 4.2
PT ≥
(
1− T
Tacc
+
T
TL
)
H(X)−
TH
(∑bTaccT c
i=1 Xi
)
Tacc
(55)
where TL = lcm (T, Tacc), where X,X1, · · · , XbTaccT c are are i.i.d. binomial B(T, λ).
We give the proof of (55) when T does not divide Tacc.
Proof: From Lemma 4.1, the privacy of the accumulate-and-serve scheduler is lower-bounded by
PT ≥ lim
n→∞
H
(
X
nTL
T |Z
nTL
Tacc
)
nTL
T
(56)
where TL = lcm(Tacc, T ).
Notice that the clock period boundaries and accumulate interval boundaries overlap every TL time
slots; i.e,
(i+1)TL
T∑
j=
iTL
T
+1
Xj =
(i+1)TL
Tacc∑
j=
iTL
Tacc
+1
Zj , i = 0, 1, · · · . (57)
Thus, (56) can be rewritten as
PT ≥ lim
n→∞
∑n−1
i=0 H
(
X
(i+1)TL
T
iTL
T
+1
∣∣∣Z (i+1)TLTacciTL
Tacc
+1
)
nTL
T
(a)
=
H
(
X
TL
T
∣∣Z TLTacc )
TL
T
(58)
where (a) follows from the fact that both sequence X and Z are i.i.d. binomial random variables.
Among the first TLT clock periods,
TL
Tacc
− 1 clock periods lie across two accumulate intervals. For
example, in Figure 9, where T = 3 and Tacc = 4, the 2nd and 3rd T -clock period cross two accumulate
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intervals. Denote Y2
(
TL
Tacc
−1
)
to be the number of users’s jobs in split clock periods,
Y2(j−1)+1 + Y2j = Xd jTaccT e, j = 1, 2 · · · ,
TL
Tacc
− 1, (59)
and assign Y2
(
TL
Tacc
−1
)
to the attacker as extra information, we get
H
(
X
TL
T
∣∣Z TLTacc ) ≥ H (XTLT ∣∣∣Z TLTacc ,Y2( TLTacc−1))
(b)
=
TL
Tacc∑
j=1
H
(
X
d jTaccT e−1
d (j−1)TaccT e+1
∣∣∣Zj , Y2j , Y2j+1)
(c)
=
TL
Tacc∑
j=1
H
Xd jTaccT e−1d (j−1)TaccT e+1
∣∣∣ d jTaccT e−1∑
k=d (j−1)TaccT e+1
Xk

(d)
=
TL
Tacc∑
j=1
H (Xd jTaccT e−1d (j−1)TaccT e+1
)
−H
 d
jTacc
T e−1∑
k=d (j−1)TaccT e+1
Xk


(e)
=
(
TL
T
− TL
Tacc
+ 1
)
H(X)−
TL
Tacc∑
j=1
H
 d
jTacc
T e−1∑
k=d (j−1)TaccT e+1
Xk

(f)
≥
(
TL
T
− TL
Tacc
+ 1
)
H(X)− TL
Tacc
H
b
Tacc
T c∑
k=1
Xk

(60)
where X,X1, · · · , XbTaccT c are i.i.d. B(T, λ), (b) applies the chain rule and dependencies between X
and Z,Y, (c) follows from
Zj = Y2j + Y2j+1 +
d jTaccT e−1∑
k=d (j−1)TaccT e+1
Xk, j = 1, 2, · · · , TL
Tacc
, (61)
(d) results from the fact that variables in sequence X are i.i.d., (e) makes use of
TL
Tacc∑
j=1
(⌈
jTacc
T
⌉
−
⌈
(j − 1)Tacc
T
⌉
− 1
)
=
(
TL
T
− TL
Tacc
+ 1
)
, (62)
and (f) follows from ⌈
jTacc
T
⌉
−
⌈
(j − 1)Tacc
T
⌉
− 1 ≤
⌊
Tacc
T
⌋
. (63)
Substituting (60) back in (58), (55) is proved.
October 9, 2018 DRAFT
25
REFERENCES
[1] B. W. Lampson, “A note on the confinement problem,” Commun. ACM, vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 613–615, October 1973.
[2] J. K. Millen, “Finite-State Noiseless Covert Channels,” in Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Franconia, NH, 1989,
pp. 81 – 86.
[3] I. S. Moskowitz, S. J. Greenwald, and M. H. Kang, “An Analysis of the Timed Z-channel,” in IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, Oakland, CA, 1996, pp. 2 – 11.
[4] P. C. Kocher, “Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems,” in Proc. 16th
Annual International Cryptology Conf. on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), Santa Barbara, CA, 1996, pp. 104–113.
[5] C. Percival, “Cache missing for fun and profit,” Ottawa, Canada, 2005.
[6] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in
third-party compute clouds,” in Proc. 16th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Chicago, IL,
2009, pp. 199–212.
[7] X. Gong, N. Borisov, N. Kiyavash, and N. Schear, “Website Detection Using Remote Traffic Analysis,” in Privacy
Enhancing Technologies Symposium, Vigo, Spain, 2012.
[8] S. Kadloor, X. Gong, N. Kiyavash, T. Tezcan, and N. Borisov, “Low-cost side channel traffic analysis attack in packet
networks,” in IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), Cape Town, South Africa, 2010, pp. 1–5.
[9] V. Anantharam and S. Verdu´, “Bits through queues,” IEEE Trans. on Inf. Theory, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 4–18, 1996.
[10] A. B. Wagner and V. Anantharam, “Information theory of covert timing channels,” in NATO/ASI Workshop on Network
Security and Intrusion Detection, Yerevan, Armenia, 2005.
[11] M. H. Kang and I. S. Moskowitz, “A pump for rapid, reliable, secure communication,” in Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), Fairfax, Virginia, 1993.
[12] M. H. Kang, I. S. Moskowitz, and D. C. Lee, “A Network Pump,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 22,
pp. 329–338, 1996.
[13] S. Gorantla, S. Kadloor, T. Coleman, N. Kiyavash, I. Moskowitz, and M. Kang, “Characterizing the efficacy of the nrl
network pump in mitigating covert timing channels,” IEEE Trans. on Inf. Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 64 –
75, 2012.
[14] J. Giles and B. Hajek, “An information-theoretic and game-theoretic study of timing channels,” IEEE Trans. on Inf. Theory,
vol. 48, pp. 2455–2477, 2002.
[15] S. Kadloor, N. Kiyavash, and P. Venkitasubramaniam, “Mitigating timing based information leakage in shared schedulers,”
in 31st IEEE International Conf. on Computer Communications (Infocom), Orlando,FL, 2012, pp. 1044–1052.
[16] S. Kadloor and N. Kiyavash, “Delay optimal policies offer very little privacy,” in 32nd IEEE International Conf. on
Computer Communications (Infocom), Turin, Italy, 2013.
[17] X. Gong, N. Kiyavash, and P. Venkitasubramaniam, “Information theoretic analysis of side channel information leakage
in fcfs schedulers,” in Proc. IEEE International Symposium in Information Theory (ISIT), Saint Petersburg, Russia, 2011,
pp. 1255–1259.
[18] R. B. Ash, Information Theory. Dover Publications, 1990.
October 9, 2018 DRAFT
26
[19] J. A. McFadden, “The Entropy of a Point Process,” Siam Journal on Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 988 – 994,
1965.
[20] X. Gong and N. Kiyavash. The optimal sampling strategy on bernoulli processes: Information theoretical perspective.
[Online]. Available: http://publish.illinois.edu/xungong1/files/2013/05/opt sample.pdf
[21] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Sys. Tech. J., vol. 54, pp. 1355 – 1387, 1975.
[22] M. Feder and N. Merhav, “Relations between entropy and error probability,” IEEE Tran. on Inf. Theory, vol. 40, no. 1,
pp. 259 – 266, 1994.
[23] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. Wiley-Interscience, 1991.
[24] O. Frank, “Entropy of sums of random digits,” Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 177–184,
1994.
[25] F. G. Foster, “On the stochastic matrices associated with certain queuing processes,” Ann. Math. Statistics, vol. 24, pp.
355–360, 1953.
[26] R. S. Gilks, W.R. and D. Spiegelhalter, Markov Chain Monte Carlo in Practice. Chapman and Hall, 1995.
October 9, 2018 DRAFT
